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Parental Initiative in the Age of Signal Bleed
Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Del.
1998), prob.juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (June 21, 1999) (No. 98-1682).
"Signal bleed" describes the partial reception of sexually explicit
premium cable-television programming in the homes of non-subscribers to
that programming. A colloquial term for the often grotesquely distorted
images and "assorted orgiastic moans and groans" 2 that are transmitted as a
result of inadequate scrambling technology is "Picasso porn."3 Some have
viewed the phenomenon more skeptically as a deliberate "tease." ' Three
years ago, in an effort to protect American children from exposure to
indecent signal bleed, Congress enacted section 505 of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).5 Entitled "Scrambling of Sexually Explicit
Adult Video Service Programming," section 505 requires cable-system
operators either (i) to scramble fully the transmission to non-subscribers of
"sexually explicit" or otherwise "indecent" programming on any channels
that are "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming," 6 or (ii) to
time-channel the transmission of such programming to a "safe harbor"
period between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.7 To comply with section 505, most cable
operators have resorted to time-channeling rather than bear the greater cost
1. Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States (Playboy 111). 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 708 (D.
Del. 1998).
2. Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States (Playboy 11). 945 F. Supp. 772. 779 (D. Del.
1996).
3. PJ. Huffstutter, Elements of Nerdspeak Net Argot Creeping into Vernacular, LA. DAILY
NEws, May 19, 1997, at BI.
4. Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast, June 23. 1999) (statement of Bruce
Taylor).
5. 47 U.S.C.A. § 561 (West Supp. m11 1998).
6. Id. § 561(a).
7. See id. § 561(b); Implementation of Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
11 F.C.C.R. 5386, 5387 (1996).
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of overhauling their scrambling technology.' Since February of 1996,
Playboy Entertainment Group has sought a declaratory judgment that the
provisions of section 505 violate the First Amendment and injunctive relief
preventing their enforcement. In the process, Playboy has been granted a
temporary restraining order,9 denied a preliminary injunction,"° and granted
a permanent injunction." Now, for the second time, 2 United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group13 is before the Supreme Court.
This case deserves more attention than it has received. Signal bleed
represents what may become an all-too-familiar phenomenon: diffusive
indecent speech and a technology designed to filter that speech that is only
partially effective, that allows traces of indecency to "bleed" through.
From the beginning, the hinge on which Playboy has turned is the question
of whether a less restrictive fix for signal bleed is available in section 504
of the CDA, which enables cable subscribers to request the complete
scrambling of any channel, indecent or otherwise, free of charge.4 Students
of Reno v. ACLU 5 may recognize in this question a conventional
dichotomy of First Amendment thinking on indecency filtering: Is the
facilitation of parent-initiated filtering sufficient to protect minors from
indecent speech, or should providers be required themselves to implement
costly, systemic, and possibly ruinous filtering regimes? Underlying both
sides of this dichotomy is a more fundamental question, one that
confounded the lower courts in Playboy and that has not yet been
adequately addressed by the Supreme Court: What degree of parental
initiative should First Amendment doctrine demand or expect? The Reno
Court evaded this question by betting that "reasonably effective" or "at
least as effective" parent-initiated filtering regimes "will soon be widely
available." 16 But in section 504 that regime is available. The future of
parental initiative is now. Playboy puts Reno's technological meliorism to
the test and asks the question that Reno deferred.
This Case Note analyzes and endorses the Playboy district court's
innovative, if sometimes inconsistent, approach to the issue of parental
initiative. Confronted with parents' near total failure to take advantage of
8. See Playboy 111, 30 F. Supp. at 711.
9. See Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States (Playboy 1), 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del.
1996).
10. See Playboy 11, 945 F. Supp. at 772.
11. See Playboy 111, 30 F. Supp. at 702.
12. In Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States, 520 U.S. 1141 (1997), the Supreme
Court affirmed without comment the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction.
13. Prob.juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (June 21, 1999) (No. 98-1682).
14. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 560 (West Supp. III 1998).
15. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
16. Id. at 846. For criticism of this aspect of the Reno opinion, see Lawrence Lessig, What
Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998), and Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 Sul'. CT.
REv. 141.
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section 504's full-scrambling provisions, the court that issued the
permanent injunction in Playboy expanded the concept of parental initiative
to include the possibility of parental abstention, or informed parental
inaction. This is an important advance in current First Amendment doctrine.
As less restrictive parent-initiated filtering mechanisms become "widely
available" throughout the electronic media, it is likely that many parents
will elect not to use them, and will do so notwithstanding government
claims that indecency harms their children. Lest the momentum of Reno be
reversed, least-restrictive-alternative analysis needs to be prepared to
defend this result. In its development of the concept of informed parental
abstention, the Playboy district court demonstrates how this defense may
succeed.
Though Playboy is properly understood as a sequel to Reno, it arrives at
the Supreme Court from a different but no less troubled region of the First
Amendment landscape, the "doctrinal wasteland"17 of the cable-television
medium. The current state of the art in First Amendment doctrine relating
to cable is Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
FCC, 8 a case which one commentator has called "arguably ... the nadir of
the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence." 9 The fractured authorities of
Denver Area failed to clarify whether content-based regulations of cable
television should receive strict scrutiny, as apparently endorsed by Turner
Broadcasting System v. FCC,20 or some lower standard of scrutiny, such as
that applied to the radio-broadcast medium in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation." For better or worse, Denver Area was handed down as a
work in progress. Its plurality urged caution before the new media but, in
doing so, produced a cautionary object lesson in support of the proposition
that medium-specific considerations are properly analyzed through the
application of strict scrutiny.'
Playboy has proven to be another such object lesson. It has confirmed
Justice Kennedy's prediction that the Denver Area plurality's "flight from
17. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 813 (1996) (Thomas.
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
18. 518 U.S. at 727.
19. James C. Goodale, Caught in Breyer's Patch, 216 N.Y. L.J. 1 (1996).
20. 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (" [T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First
Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation ... does not apply in the context of cable
regulation.").
21. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that, in light of the "'pervasiveness" of the medium, the
FCC could use administrative sanctions to regulate indecent speech in radio programming).
22- See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 804 (Kennedy, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(" [Pervasive-medium] concerns are weighty and will be relevant to whether the law passes strict
scrutiny. They do not justify, however, a blanket rule of lesser protection for indecent speech.").
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standards '23  would "sow confusion in the courts bound by our
precedents." 24 After postponing its preliminary injunction decision until the
Supreme Court's ruling in Denver Area, the three-judge district court was
clearly somewhat mystified as to how to proceed in its "aftermath." 25 In
quick succession, the Playboy court noted the plurality's unwillingness to
"declare a 'rigid single standard,"' acknowledged the strict scrutiny
standard endorsed by the "other five members of the Court," and then
settled upon "strict scrutiny or something very close to strict scrutiny."26
"[W]hatever the standard of scrutiny, 2 7 the district court upheld
section 505 "[b]ecause the Supreme Court endorsed a time-channeling
solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica Foundation.,' 8 This
method did not survive in the opinion granting the permanent injunction.
There, the court made only passing reference to Pacifica and Denver Area
and cited the later case as authority for the application of conventional
least-restrictive-alternative analysis.29
II
If it is true, as many have argued, that the age of medium-specificity is
in its twilight,3 ° then Turner and Pacifica form a dialectic waiting to be
transcended. Denver Area implies as much, and the lower-court history of
Playboy suggests a certain ripeness. The new synthesis for content-based
regulations of the electronic media will likely be called "strict scrutiny,"
perhaps in Playboy, perhaps elsewhere. If parental initiative is to play any
role in this new synthesis, Pacifica's notion of pervasiveness must be
reformulated to reflect "the new technology." 3 This reformulation should
take two forms.
First, notwithstanding three decades of McLuhanesque hype,2 First
Amendment jurisprudence should consider the pervasiveness of the content,
not of the medium. The opinion granting the permanent injunction in
Playboy properly demonstrated the importance of this distinction. For the
23. Id.
24. Id. at 786.
25. Playboy II, 945 F. Supp. at 784.
26. Id. (quoting Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 742)
27. Id. at 785.
28. Id. at 789.
29. See Playboy III, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
30. See, e.g., Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal
Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976.
1013 (1997) (" [T]hejurisprudential debate in Denver Area should not distract from a larger unity.
Now, all the Justices seem to be gliding toward consolidated approaches to the media which differ
from the schema of media classification that had been dominant just two terms ago in Turner I.").
31. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring).
32. See generally MARSHALL McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA (1964).
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district court, the gravamen of the case was not whether cable television
was a pervasive medium, but whether the specific indecent content at issue
was itself pervasive. The court discounted the Government's evidence of
households with the "potential to be exposed" (pervasive-medium
evidence) and demanded instead some quantitative evidence of households
"actually exposed" (pervasive-content evidence).33 In qualitative terms, the
court implied that even when exposure to signal bleed does occur, its
indecent content is often garbled beyond recognition, rendering the images
harmless to children.' Thus, notwithstanding the pervasiveness of the
medium, the court concluded that signal bleed was not a "pervasive
problem." 35 As we "approach the day of using a common receiver" ' for all
content, for CNN as well as for an individual's dead letter to the web, this
distinction between the medium and the varying reach of its messages
becomes all the more meaningful.
Second, indecency jurisprudence should calibrate pervasiveness
according to the extent of control that an individual can exert over the
receipt of content through the medium at issue. 37 From this follows a
"spectrum of control.. . for the electronic media,"3 with broadcasting at
one extreme and the telephone or the World Wide Web at the other. 9
Though Playboy would appear to present classic broadcast-medium facts, in
that a child may encounter signal bleed accidentally by browsing through
cable channels, a "spectrum of control" analysis of section 504 urges a
different, more promising result. Indeed, the Playboy district court
demonstrated the potential of this analysis when it speculated that
section 504 might control children's exposure to signal bleed more
effectively than the broadcast-era time channeling provisions of
section 505, since "a resourceful minor can still watch signal bleed after the
safe-harbour hours," whereas "parental vigilance" can eliminate signal
bleed altogether.'
33. Playboy III, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
34. See id. at 716.
35. Id. at 719.
36. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring).
37. See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1062, 1080 (1994).
38. Id.
39. The Supreme Court has already begun to move toward this theory of pervasiveness,
though indirectly, in its application of ' affirmative steps" analysis to the Internct and dial-a-porn.
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997) (noting the district court's finding that "the risk of
encountering indecent material by accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is
required to access specific material."); Sable Communications v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115. 127-28
(1989) ("[T]he dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the
communication. There is no 'captive audience' problem here; callers will generally not be
unwilling listeners.").
40. Playboy 111, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
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III
Taken together, sections 504 and 505 form a "multi-layered" 41 content-
based regulatory scheme. As a filtering mechanism initiated and controlled
by the receiver of content, section 504 is said to be the likely future of
indecency regulation. As a filtering mechanism initiated and controlled by
the transmitter, section 505 is said to be its likely past.42 When the Playboy
permanent-injunction court applied "strict scrutiny or something very close
to strict scrutiny," it found itself wandering between these two worlds. In
enjoining section 505, the court arrived at the right result. It did so,
however, by finessing a question that continues to confuse indecency
jurisprudence: How should least-restrictive-alternative analysis interpret
parents' failure to take advantage of the indecency controls made available
to them?
The issue came last in the opinion and nearly unraveled everything
before it. The court noted that the Government had supplemented the record
with survey evidence concerning a fourteen-month period when section 504
was in effect and section 505 was not. During this period, cable system
operators distributed section 504 blocking technology to only 0.5% of their
subscribers. While the Government presented this statistic as evidence of
the ineffectiveness of section 504, Playboy argued that it showed only the
"lack of parents' concern."'43 The court agreed with Playboy. The 0.5%
statistic was "consistent ... with a societal response that signal bleed is not
a pervasive problem."" Such a result must have surprised the Government.
In the Playboy court's preliminary-injunction opinion, the section 504
alternative failed for want of adequate notice to or adequate response by
parents, yet here it somehow thrived. Perhaps more suprisingly, the court
then pointed to an additional problem with the Government's interpretation
of its survey evidence: The interpretation was "premised on adequate
notice to subscribers. It is not clear, however, from the record that notices
of the provisions of § 504 have been adequate." 45 Accordingly, the court
volunteered a shorthand version of "adequate notice" and specified
appropriate venues for its broadcast and publication. 6
41. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast
Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1155 (1996) ("What I fear is that the V-chip will be used instead
to impose an additional layer of content-based regulation on top of existing indecency prohibitions
and safe harbor provisions.... Courts must be especially vigilant to ensure that a 'multi-layered'
approach to broadcast regulation does not result.").
42. See Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619
(1995).
43. Playboy 111, 30 F. Supp. 2d. at 719.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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This reasoning is as distorted as signal bleed itself. It attests to the fact
that First Amendment doctrine lacks an authoritative model of parental
initiative. The Supreme Court has recognized that parents have the
"primary responsibility for children's well-being [and] are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."'4 7 But the
Court has never clearly stated where governmental "support" should end
and parental "responsibility" should begin. A number of models have taken
shape despite the Court's silence. In a somewhat notorious passage in its
brief for Denver Area, the Government provided a strong form of one
model, which rejected the viability of subscriber-initiated filtering
technology because of the condition of "absence, distraction, indifference,
inertia, or insufficient information" that besets "innumerable parents" in
Americai5 Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit is the champion
of a contrasting model, which denies that "parents are unavailable and inept
at the task of parenting" '49 and seeks to protect parental choice from
encroachment by censors acting in its name.'
But the problem is not one of modeling parental responsibility. The
problem is the persistence of a "multi-layered" compelling-interest
framework in which the old and the new uneasily coexist. Indecency
jurisprudence has long held that the government has an "independent"
interest in protecting American youth from indecency." As Chief Judge
Edwards has argued, this independent interest tends to override the
government's interest in facilitating or "support[ing] parental supervision
of children." 2 Playboy demonstrates one way in which this can occur.
When, as with section 504, parents fail to take advantage of indecency
controls, the independent interest assumes misinformed or even negligent
parents, for to do otherwise would cut against the authority of its own
claims concerning harm. Like Justice Thomas's peculiar, broadcast-era
version of parental facilitation in Denver Area,53 the independent interest's
"default" is censorship. It operates according to the government censor's
vision of an identity between governmental and parental interests. At its
47. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,639 (1968).
48. Respondent's Brief at 37, Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC. 518 U.S.
727 (1996) (Nos. 95-124, 95-227).
49. Action for Children's Television v. FCC. 58 F.3d 654. 679 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards.
CJ., dissenting).
50. See Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1487, 1563 (1995) ("The state's compelling interest lies not in protecting children, but
in protecting parenting.").
51. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 ("The State also has an independent interest in the
well-being of its youth.").
52. Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 678 (Edwards, CJ., dissenting).
53. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 832 (Thomas. J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("Our precedents establish that government may support parental authority to
direct the moral upbringing of their children by imposing a blocking requirement as a default
position.").
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core, it assumes that if parents only knew, or had the power, they would act
as the government would.
For decades, the independent interest has occupied a seemingly
unassailable position in indecency jurisprudence. With the rise of parent-
initiated filtering technology, however, this position may well find itself
under siege. As filtering technology improves and its capabilities become
widely publicized, the probability that parents suffer from "insufficient
information" decreases, and the degree of parental initiative necessary to
control indecency declines. With a low threshold for parent-initiated
filtering, the argument that the government should act on behalf of inactive
parents who are too "distracted" or "inert" to cross that threshold loses
much of its force. It yields to the probability that inactive parents have
made a passive judgment that the controls available to them are simply
unnecessary. In this sense, by devolving competence upon parents,
parent-initiated filtering technology creates the conditions for an informal
referendum on indecency control, some of whose results may refute the
identity of governmental and parental interests.
In Playboy, the district court sought to create the conditions for just
such a referendum. The court's strategy was straightforward: "With
adequate notice of the issue of signal bleed, parents can decide for
themselves whether it is a problem. Thus to any parent for whom signal
bleed is a concern, § 504, along with 'adequate notice,' is an effective
solution."5 4 In essence, this is a traditional "more speech" remedy."
Comparable in effect to the Denver Area majority's notion of
"informational requirements, 5 6 "adequate notice" redefines parental
initiative as a matter of information, not action. Under its terms, if parents
are informed, then they are sufficiently "initiated" to preclude government
intervention on their behalf. This model of parental initiation represents a
shift away from the independent interest, which demands that parents act
(or else the government will act for them), and toward the facilitation
interest, which demands simply that parents know. The result is that notice
is no longer judged adequate according to how many parents act on it.
Rather, notice is judged adequate according to the extent to which it
enhances a parent's authority and, perhaps more importantly, legitimates a
parent's decision not to act in the way that the government would.
-Barton Beebe
54. Playboy II1, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
55. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.. concurring)
(" [T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones .... If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
56. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 759.
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